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(U) CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

(C) Summary

China's interest in Africa focuses primarily on southern Africa and the Horn--important areas of superpower rivalry in which China believes it can expand its own influence. The Chinese are openly critical of the US policy of constructive engagement, but concur in the US goal of limiting Soviet penetration of the region. Because of its independent foreign policy, China is not widely perceived by Sub-Saharan Africa as a US stalking horse. It is thus well positioned to play an indirect and positive role in limiting Soviet influence and curbing possible excesses by the more radical southern African states and insurgencies.

* * * * *

Chinese Efforts in Africa--Overview

(C) China's sub-Saharan policy has undergone several changes since the early 1960s when China first became involved in the African Continent. Although Africa has never been a primary concern of Beijing, relations with regional countries--especially in southern Africa and the Horn--serve important Chinese goals. China saw the continent as "ripe for revolution" during the late 1960s and supported a number of insurgencies in independent black African states and in the colonies. Chinese support for African insurgencies receded, however, in the early 1970s, as Beijing became increasingly preoccupied with demanding domestic economic and political issues and shifted its efforts more toward countering Soviet inroads in the region.

(C) China grew more selective in its African efforts as it became increasingly aware of the limitations on its ability to affect developments

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on the continent. During the 1970s, it established relations with Zaire and its stand on the conflicts in Angola, Shaba region in Zaire, and the Horn became similar to that of the US. In fact, Beijing advised the West to be more aggressive in combatting the Soviet danger to its "southern flanks" and emphasized that the USSR was the main problem in Africa.

(S/NP/NC) This policy entailed some cost to China's non-aligned credentials. With the development of its self-proclaimed "independent" foreign policy, China in the 1980s has fine-tuned its policy toward Africa. The Chinese have tried to strengthen their Third World image by shifting the focus of their criticism from the Soviets alone to South Africa and "the superpowers" as the sources of Africa's troubles. China's efforts to compete with the USSR in Africa have also taken the form of increased--but selective--economic and military assistance. In the past three years, China has extended more than \$482 million in economic aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (including more than \$358 million in agreements signed in 1984 alone) and delivered \$237 million worth of arms.

(S/NP/NC) In addition to sharply increasing economic and military aid, the Chinese are actively pursuing commercial relations in Africa. Since 1979, they have designed construction projects to generate foreign exchange. The standard Chinese tactic of substantially underbidding Western firms has earned African good will while it has secured China a niche in the Third World construction market. Chinese trade with Sub-Saharan Africa exceeded \$855 million in 1984 and was highly favorable to China. The Chinese are also increasing arms sales (as opposed to credit sales or grant aid transfers) to Africa, earning nearly \$112 million since 1980, and have made a start in international banking by joining the African Development Bank last May.

Southern Africa

(S/NP/NC/OC) South Africa. China has no diplomatic relations with South Africa--which recognizes Taipei--and quietly competes with the Soviet bloc for influence among the Front Line States and insurgencies directed against the South African Government. China has criticized the US policy of constructive engagement, but applauded the recent Senate vote mandating sanctions against South Africa. The Chinese also seek to counter the Soviets' influence by providing diplomatic support, food aid, and possibly arms and training to the African National Congress (ANC) and the smaller Pan-Africanist Congress - Azania (PAC-A).

(S/NP/NC) Angola. Chinese efforts to promote a nonaligned image in Sub-Saharan Africa were long hampered by China's

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large-scale assistance to the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and marginal support for UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) during the height of the Angolan civil war in 1975. After years of sporadic negotiations with the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) regime, however, China improved its image by normalizing relations with Angola in January 1983. Beijing scrupulously avoids criticizing Luanda and has provided Angola with \$25.2 million in economic aid and 2,000 tons of grain in an effort to enhance its long-term influence with this Soviet client state (see Table 1, appended). China privately favors the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, but opposes linking such a move to Namibian independence.

(S/NF/NC/OC) Namibia. China endorses UN Security Council Resolution 435 and has sharply criticized the West, especially the US, for being overly patient with South Africa on the Namibian issue. It has called the "interim" government in Windhoek "an act of deception" and considers the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)--which it reportedly provides with limited food assistance and diplomatic support--to be the most viable prospective regime for Namibia.

(S/NF/NC/OC) Zimbabwe. China has supported Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) faction since before independence. This longstanding political support--coupled with China's extension of almost \$67 million in economic aid and \$42 million in military assistance since 1980 (see Table 2)--gives Beijing a measure of influence in Harare. Beijing is concerned about Mugabe's anti-white and anti-Ndebele policies and his plans to transform Zimbabwe into a one-party socialist state before developing the national economy, and Chinese leaders reportedly will privately urge him to adopt a more moderate line when he visits China next month.

(S/NF/NC) Mozambique. China had fairly good relations with the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the principal insurgent group, in the years just prior to independence. The Chinese established diplomatic relations when Mozambique became independent in 1975. Relations at first were good, and China in 1975 agreed to provide Mozambique with \$59 million in economic assistance. Sino-Mozambican relations soured, however, between 1977 and 1981, when Mozambique aligned itself closely with the Soviet bloc. Relations appear to be improving now that Mozambique is moving away from the Soviet bloc. The Chinese did not publicly criticize Maputo's controversial 1984 peace agreement with Pretoria, and President Samora Machel visited Beijing a few months after the agreement was signed. China extended more than \$20 million in economic aid in 1984, and this

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year reportedly has begun to provide Mozambique with limited military assistance.

(S/NP/NC) Botswana and Lesotho. China strongly condemned South Africa's incursions into these two countries and has provided them with \$1.5 million and \$9.2 million in economic aid, respectively. In 1983, Lesotho expelled Taiwan's representatives and established relations with the PRC. The Chinese may see Botswana and Lesotho as good potential sources of information on developments in the region.

(S/NP/NC) Tanzania and Zambia. These states are among China's oldest friends in Africa. The Chinese consider the views of both countries' influential leaders to be important indicators of African opinion. China last year provided Tanzania with more than \$158 million in economic aid--nearly one-third of China's total foreign economic assistance budget and more than any other single country's allotment. Tanzania has received over \$28 million in Chinese arms since 1980, and its arsenal of Chinese weapons includes tanks, MiG-19 fighter aircraft, and gunboats.

(S/NP/NC) Zambia's share of China's economic and military aid is much smaller. Moreover, since the completion of the Tan-Zam Railway in 1975 and Lusaka's acceptance of 12 Soviet MiG-21 fighters in 1979, Chinese aid to Zambia has steadily declined.

(S/NP/NC) The Horn and East Africa

Since the ouster of the Soviets from Somalia in 1977, China's policy toward the Horn of Africa has complemented that of the US. China continues to condemn, although less actively than in the past, Soviet naval activity in the region and Soviet-bloc military assistance to Ethiopia. Since 1980, the Chinese have provided Somalia with food relief, almost \$48 million in military assistance (agreements), and \$13 million in economic aid. China has given \$94 million in economic assistance and provided \$85 million in military aid to Sudan since 1980. Relations with Kenya have improved since the late 1960s, and China has given the Kenyans \$46 million in economic aid since 1980. China has also provided small amounts of economic assistance to Uganda and Djibouti.

(S/NP/NC) Central Africa

Zaire has been the principal recipient of Chinese attention in central Africa. After supporting rebellions in eastern Zaire in the 1960s, China normalized relations in 1972 and since then has closely paralleled US policy toward Zaire--including supporting

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Mobutu against the 1977 and 1978 invasions of Shaba region. China provided more than \$130 million in economic aid to Zaire in the 1970s, but has extended no credits or loans since 1980. It has, however, delivered nearly \$34 million in artillery and gunboats since 1980.

Recent Chinese aid to neighboring Congo has been primarily economic. China has agreed to loan Brazzaville \$124 million for hydroelectric projects, but has provided only nominal military assistance. The smaller central African states of Gabon, Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe, Rwanda, and Burundi in the 1970s received loans totaling \$148 million. Since 1980, China has delivered \$8.6 million in arms and ammunition to Rwanda and has extended limited economic assistance to the Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea.

(S/NP/NC/OC) West Africa

China's interest in west Africa was significant during the Maoist period, when such radical states as Guinea, Ghana, and Mali were considered crucial partners in China's then-revolutionary Third World diplomacy. Since 1980, however, less than \$150 million of China's \$845 million in economic aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has gone to west Africa. China has tried to recover its west African loans through such means as a commodity repayment deal recently concluded with Sierra Leone and has been reluctant to extend further loans to Liberia. But the Chinese have praised the west African economic community and continue to explore construction and trade opportunities in the region.

Recent Chinese arms sales to west Africa have been minimal. Guinea reportedly bought \$3 million in arms in 1982; Nigeria purchased \$11 million worth in 1983; and Mali, Togo, and Liberia obtained small amounts of Chinese military aid in the 1980s.

(S/NP/NC/OC) Indian Ocean

In the 1970s, China provided Madagascar with about \$78 million in economic assistance and limited arms aid. Recently there have been discussions about additional small-ticket arms transfers. Beijing has not extended aid to Mauritius for some time and earlier this year protested an unpublicized visit to Taiwan by the Mauritian Prime Minister. China has signed no new aid agreements with either the Seychelles or the Comoros, although construction projects continue under existing agreements.

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(S/NP/NC) Table 1

Chinese Economic Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1954-84
(in million US\$)

| | <u>1984</u> <u>(Extended)</u> | <u>1980-84</u> <u>(Extended)</u> | <u>1954-84</u> <u>(Extended/Drawn)</u> |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| Southern Africa | 212.8 | 328.0 | 1,150.3/757.2 |
| Angola | 25.2 | 25.2 | 25.2/0.2 |
| Botswana | 0 | 15.6 | 32.2/11.6 |
| Lesotho | 9.2 | 9.2 | 9.2/0.1 |
| Mozambique | 20.2 | 25.1 | 84.9/29.9 |
| Tanzania | 158.2 | 172.2 | 586.7/369.5 |
| Zambia | 0 | 14.0 | 345.4/337.9 |
| Zimbabwe | 0 | 66.7 | 66.7/8.0 |
| East Africa/Horn | 37.4 | 219.9 | 618.5/365.3 |
| Djibouti | 0 | 30.0 | 30.0/7.0 |
| Ethiopia | 0 | 36.0 | 138.5/87.0 |
| Kenya | 0 | 46.4 | 64.3/11.0 |
| Somalia | 0.2 | 13.3 | 168.1/164.8 |
| Sudan | 37.2 | 94.2 | 176.1/86.9 |
| Uganda | 0 | 0 | 41.5/8.6 |
| Central Africa | 9.1 | 151.0 | 740.9/514.9 |
| Burundi | 0 | 0 | 58.0/58.0 |
| Cameroon | 0 | 0 | 103.4/103.4 |
| Central African Republic | 0 | 15.0 | 29.2/12.7 |
| Chad | 0 | 0 | 67.6/9.9 |
| Congo | 0 | 123.9 | 199.1/107.2 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 9.1 | 12.1 | 46.2/37.1 |
| Gabon | 0 | 0 | 25.0/15.9 |
| Rwanda | 0 | 0 | 56.5/31.9 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 0 | 0 | 18.3/3.2 |
| Zaire | 0 | 0 | 137.6/135.6 |
| West Africa | 99.2 | 146.0 | 803.2/551.3 |
| Benin | 12.2 | 12.3 | 56.3/42.3 |
| Burkina | 8.7 | 8.7 | 59.7/23.8 |
| Cape Verde | 0 | 0.3 | 17.2/4.2 |
| Gambia, The | 0 | 0 | 26.8/18.0 |
| Ghana | 0 | 0 | 42.0/38.6 |
| Guinea | 0 | 44.0 | 143.5/100.3 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0 | 0 | 16.6/9.1 |

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| | <u>1984</u> <u>(Extended)</u> | <u>1980-84</u> <u>(Extended)</u> | <u>1954-84</u> <u>(Extended/Drawn)</u> |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| West Africa (cont'd) | | | |
| Liberia | 50.0 | 50.0 | 73.0/25.0 |
| Mali | 5.0 | 7.4 | 133.9/116.7 |
| Niger | 5.4 | 5.4 | 57.7/33.5 |
| Senegal | 0.4 | 0.4 | 52.3/40.6 |
| Sierra Leone | 17.5 | 17.5 | 78.7/63.2 |
| Togo | 0 | 0 | 45.5/36.0 |
| Indian Ocean | 0 | 0 | 143.1/97.9 |
| Comoros | 0 | 0 | 15.0/8.0 |
| Madagascar | 0 | 0 | 89.4/81.3 |
| Mauritius | 0 | 0 | 35.2/5.1 |
| Seychelles | 0 | 0 | 3.5/3.5 |
| Grand Total | 358.5 | 844.9 | 3,456.0/2,286.6 |

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(S/NF/NC) Table 2

**Chinese Military Agreements With/Deliveries to
Sub-Saharan Africa, 1954-84**
(in million US\$)

| | <u>1984</u> | <u>1980-84</u> | <u>1954-84</u> |
|--------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Southern Africa | <u>20.0/0.0</u> | <u>52.6/49.1</u> | <u>200.9/170.3</u> |
| Angola | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Botswana | 0 | 0 | 0.8/0.8 |
| Lesotho | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mozambique | 0 | 0 | 5.0/5.02/ |
| Tanzania | 0 | 10.6/28.6 | 121.6/118.0 |
| Zambia | 0 | 0.0/5.5 | 31.5/31.5 |
| Zimbabwe | 20.0/0.0 | 42.0/15.0 | 42.0/15.0 |
| East Africa/Horn | <u>7.6/18.0</u> | <u>58.1/134.8</u> | <u>160.1/151.3</u> |
| Djibouti | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Ethiopia | 0 | 0 | 3.0/3.0 |
| Kenya | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Somalia | 2.5/2.5 | 14.8/47.8 | 48.8/48.8 |
| Sudan | 5.1/15.5 | 41.3/85.0 | 106.3/97.5 |
| Uganda | 0 | 2.0/2.0 | 2.0/2.0 |
| Central Africa | 0 | <u>29.5/42.4</u> | <u>106.4/106.4</u> |
| Burundi | 0 | 0 | 2.4/2.4 |
| Cameroon | 0 | 0 | 6.7/6.7 |
| Central African Republic | 0 | 0 | 7.3/7.3 |
| Chad | 0 | negl | negl |
| Congo | 0 | 0 | 10.0/10.0 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0 | negl | negl |
| Gabon | 0 | 0 | 7.6/7.6 |
| Rwanda | 0 | 1.0/8.6 | 9.6/9.6 |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Zaire | 0 | 28.5/33.8 | 62.8/62.8 |
| West Africa | <u>1.5/1.5</u> | <u>20.7/10.7</u> | <u>42.1/31.1</u> |
| Benin | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Burkina | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Cape Verde | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Gambia, The | 0 | 0 | 3.0/3.0 |
| Ghana | 0 | 0 | 1.0/1.0 |
| Guinea | 0 | 3.0/3.0 | 11.0/11.0 |

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| | <u>1984</u> | <u>1980-84</u> | <u>1954-84</u> |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| West Africa (cont'd) | | | |
| Guinea-Bissau | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Liberia | 0 | 0.2/0.2 | 0.2/0.2 |
| Mali | 1.5/1.5 | 3.5/4.5 | 8.9/8.9 |
| Niger | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Nigeria | 0 | 11.0/0.0 | 11.0/0.0 |
| Senegal | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sierra Leone | 0 | 0 | 3.0/3.0 |
| Togo | 0 | 3.0/3.0 | 4.0/4.0 |
| Indian Ocean | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>2.5/2.5</u> |
| Comoros | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> |
| Madagascar | <u>0</u> ^{3/} | <u>0</u> | <u>1.5/1.5</u> |
| Mauritius | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> |
| Seychelles | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>1.0/1.0</u> |
| Grand Total | <u>29.1/19.5</u> | <u>160.9/237.0</u> | <u>512.0/461.6</u> |

1/ Arms agreements provide for the delivery of materiel acquired either through grant aid, credits, or purchases. Deliveries often are spread out over several years.

2/ China reportedly has started supplying small arms, ammunition, and tactical training to the Mozambican Army in 1985.

3/ Discussions reportedly are under way for the transfer of additional arms and ammunition to Madagascar.

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